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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses outsourcing in the two-type optimal income tax model. If the 
government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not 
affect the marginal income tax structure. In the absence of a direct tax instrument, and under 
the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing increases the wage differential, the 
government will implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a 
higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the latest 10-15 years, outsourcing has become an increasingly important 
business practice. Outsourcing is meant to imply that part of the production activity is 
located to another country. The large wage differences across countries is most likely 
an important explanation for this behavior, as the production costs may be 
substantially reduced if part of the production is located to a country with lower 
wages
1. Although earlier research has addressed the implications of outsourcing for 
unemployment and welfare policy
2, there are (to our knowledge) no earlier studies 
dealing with how the appearance of outsourcing may modify the optimal use of 
redistributive nonlinear income taxation. 
 
The purpose of this short paper is to incorporate outsourcing into the two-type 
optimal income tax model developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). We show 
that if the government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, then 
outsourcing will not modify the policy rules for the marginal income tax rates. Instead, 
the government will use a positive tax on outsourcing, which contributes to reduce the 
wage inequality and, therefore, also to relax the self-selection constraint. On the other 
hand, if the government is not able to directly tax outsourcing, it will modify from 
social welfare point of view its use of income taxation accordingly. In this case, and 
under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing  increases wage differentials, 
our results show that outsourcing provides an incentive for the government to 
implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher 
marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done. 
 
In Section 2, we present the model, whereas the optimal use of income taxation 
is discussed in Section 3. Finally, we present a brief summary in Section 4. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Amiti and Wei (2004), Rishi and Saxena (2004) and Sinn (2007). 
2 See e.g. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2007). 
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2. The Model 
 
We consider a model with two-ability types; a low-ability type (denoted by index 1) 
and a high-ability type (denoted by index 2). This distinction refers to productivity, 
which is interpreted to mean that the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage 
rate than the low-ability type. As the number of individuals of each ability-type is not 
important here, it will be normalized to one for notational convenience. The utility 
function facing ability-type i is written as 
 
 (,)
ii i uu c z =       (1) 
 
where c is consumption and z leisure. Leisure is, in turn, defined as a time endowment, 
H, less the time spent in market work, l. The individual budget constraint is written as 
 
 () 0
ii ii i wl T wl c −− =      (2) 
 
in which w is the hourly gross wage rate and  ) (
i il w T  the income tax payment. The 
first order condition for the hours of work becomes 
 
  (1 '( )) 0
ii i i i
cz uw T wl u − −=      (3) 
 
where '( ) ( )/ ( )
ii ii ii Tw l T w l w l =∂ ∂  is the marginal income tax rate. 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, the representative firm uses three 
variable inputs, labor of each ability-type and the amount of resources outsourced to 
production abroad. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the technology is 
characterized by constant returns to scale. Following Koskela and Stenbacka (2007), 
the production function is written as 
12 (, , ) f llM, where M represents the resources 
spent on outsourcing, where outsourcing is assumed to be substitutable for unskilled 
labor and complementary with skilled labor. This assumption implies 
1
12 (, , ) 0
lM fl l M <  and  2
12 (, , ) 0
lM fl l M > . There is also a cost associated with   
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outsourcing,  () M ψ , which is increasing and strictly convex. The first order conditions 
for the firm become 
 
  1
12 1 (, , ) 0
l fllM w −=      (4) 
  2
12 2 (, , ) 0
l fl lM w −=      (5) 
 
12 (, , ) ( ) 0 MM fl l M M t ψ −− =      (6) 
 
where  t is a tax attached to outsourcing. This policy instrument may either be 
operative or not in the analysis we present in Section 3. 
 
3. Optimal Nonlinear Taxation 
 
We analyze Pareto efficient taxation, which means maximizing the utility of one of the 
ability-types subject to minimum utility restrictions for the other. Suppose that the 
government behaves as if it maximizes the utility of the low-ability type subject to 
minimum utility restrictions for the high-ability type. The minimum utility restriction 
is given by 
 
 
22 2 2 (,) uu c z u =−      (7) 
 
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government knows the income of 
each individual as well as the number of individuals of each agent-type, whereas 
ability is private information. The latter means that the government would not be able 
to observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or high-ability type. By 
concentrating on the 'normal' case, where redistribution means income transfers from 
the high-ability to the low-ability type, one would like to prevent the high-ability type 
from pretending to be a low-ability type, i.e. prevent the high-ability type from 
becoming a mimicker, in order to gain from the redistribution. The self-selection 
constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
 
22 2 1 1 2 ˆ (,) (, ) uu c z u c Hl u φ =≥ − =      (8) 
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where 
2 ˆ u  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 
12 / ww φ =  the wage ratio, i.e. the 
relative wage rate. By using the first order conditions for the firm, one can see that φ  
is a function of 
1 l , 
2 l  and M , i.e. 
12 (, , ) llM φφ = , where  / 0 M φ ∂ ∂< . Note that the 
mimicker faces the same income and consumption point (and, therefore, pays as much 
tax as) the low-ability type; however, as the mimicker is more productive than the 
low-ability type, he/she spends more time on leisure. 
The budget constraint of the government is given by 
 
 () 0
ii
i
Tw l t M += ∑      (9) 
 
Note that  ( ) T ⋅  is a general income tax in the sense that it may be used to implement 
any desired combination of 
1 l , 
1 c , 
2 l , and 
2 c . It is, therefore, convenient to follow 
earlier comparable literature by using 
1 l , 
1 c , 
2 l , and 
2 c , instead of the parameters of 
() T ⋅ , as direct decision-variables. Similarly, since control over 
1 l , 
1 c , 
2 l , and 
2 c  also 
means that the government can use t to exercise perfect control over M , we may also 
use  M  as a direct decision-variable in what follows. By using the private budget 
constraint and the zero profit condition, we may rewrite the budget constraint of the 
government to read 
 
 
12 (, , ) ( ) 0
i
i
fll M c M ψ −− = ∑      (10) 
 
The Lagrangean is given by 
 
 
12 2 2 1 2 ˆ [] [ ( , , ) ( ) ]
i
i
Lu u u u f l lM c M δλ γ ψ =+ + − + − − ∑  (11) 
 
The first order conditions in terms of hours of work, consumption and outsourcing are 
given by 
 
12 1 1
1 ˆ 0 zz uu l w
l
φ
λφ γ
∂ ⎡⎤ −+ + + = ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦
     (12)   
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12 ˆ 0 cc uu λγ −− =      (13) 
22 1 2
2 ˆ () 0 zz uu l w
l
φ
δλ λ γ
∂
−+ + + =
∂
     (14) 
2 () 0 c u δλ γ +− =      (15) 
21 ˆ [( ) () ] 0 zM M ul f M
M
φ
λγ ψ
∂
+⋅ − =
∂
     (16) 
 
We are now in the position to analyze the question: how does the appearance of 
outsourcing affect the optimal tax structure? The marginal income tax rate of the low-
ability type might be derived by combining equations (3), (12) and (13), whereas the 
marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type is derived by combining equations 
(3), (14) and (15). Finally, the tax rate on outsourcing can be derived by combining 
equations (6) and (16). Let 
  ,
i
i z
zc i
c
u
MRS
u
=  and 
2
2
, 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
z
zc
c
u
MRS
u
 
be the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption for 
ability-type i and the mimicker, respectively. We can derive 
 
*
' 1 1 122 1
,, 11 1 ˆ ˆ () [ ] zc zc z Tw l M R S M R S u l
ww l
λ λφ
φ
γ
∂
=− −
∂
   (17) 
 
 
'2 2 2 1
22 ˆ () z Tw l u l
wl
λ φ
γ
∂
=−
∂
     (18) 
 
 
21 ˆz tu l
M
λ φ
γ
∂
=−
∂
     (19) 
 
where 
*2 ˆ / c u λ λγ = . The marginal income tax rates are the same as those derived by 
Stiglitz (1982). Therefore, one would normally expect that 
'1 1 () 0 Tw l >  and 
'2 2 () 0 Tw l < . As the intuition behind the use of marginal income taxation is well 
understood from earlier research, it will not be further discussed here. 
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Note that the government may also relax the self-selection constraint via the tax 
on outsourcing. With the assumptions made above, we have
3 /0 M φ ∂ ∂< , which 
means that the optimal tax on outsourcing is positive. The intuition is that the tax on 
outsourcing reduces the amount of resources subject to outsourcing which, in turn, 
increases the wage ratio. This makes mimicking less attractive and contributes to relax 
the self-selection constraint. As such, the tax on outsourcing creates additional room 
for redistribution. In addition, since the government is able to directly control 
outsourcing, there is no need to modify the policy rules for marginal income taxation. 
 
We can summarize our finding as follows; 
 
Proposition 1. If the government is able to directly tax outsourcing, the tax 
on outsourcing will be positive at the second best optimum. In this case, the 
appearance of outsourcing will not modify the policy rules for the marginal 
income tax rates. 
 
The next question is: what happens if the tax instrument on outsourcing, for some 
reason, is not operative? In this case, the government is not able to directly control the 
outsourcing via taxation, meaning that it may have an incentive to modify its use of 
income taxation accordingly. Let 
 
21 ˆzM M ul f
M
φ
λ ψ
∂
Λ= + −
∂
 
denote the marginal welfare effect of outsourcing. Furthermore, by using equation (6), 
we can derive 
12 (, ) M Ml l = . We have the following expressions for the marginal 
income tax rates; 
 
*
' 1 1 122 1
,, 11 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ () [ ] zc zc z
M
Tw l M R S M R S u l
ww l w l
λλ φ
φ
γγ
−
∂ Λ∂
=− − −
∂ ∂ 1 4243
 (20)
  
                                                 
3 Empirical support for the idea that outsourcing leads to more inequality are provided e.g. by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Hijzen (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008). 
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'2 2 2 1
22 2 2 ˆ () z
M
Tw l u l
wl w l
λ φ
γγ
+
∂ Λ∂
=− −
∂ ∂ 14243
     (21) 
 
By comparison with equations (17) and (18), equations (20) and (21) also reflect an 
additional policy incentive created by the appearance of outsourcing, which is 
summarized by the final part on the right hand side of each marginal income tax rate 
expression. The intuition is that the government is no longer able to control 
outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, in which case it will modify its use of income 
taxation. Note from equation (6) that  0 MM f ψ − = , which means that  0 Λ< . In 
addition, by using equation (6), one can show that 
1 /0 Ml ∂ ∂< and 
2 /0 Ml ∂ ∂>. 
 
Therefore, with the assumptions made above, we have derived the following result. 
 
Proposition 2. If the government is not able to control the outsourcing via a 
direct tax instrument, then the appearance of outsourcing will contribute to 
decrease the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type and increase 
the marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that by increasing the hours of work supplied by 
the low-ability type and decreasing the hours of work supplied by the high-ability 
type, we may reduce the amount of resources that are subject to outsourcing. The latter 
contributes to relax the self-selection constraint, which creates further room for 
redistribution. 
 
4. Summary 
 
This paper analyzes the implications of outsourcing for optimal income taxation by 
using the two-type optimal income tax model. Our results show that if the government 
is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not affect 
the policy rules for the marginal income tax rates. Instead, the government uses a 
positive tax on outsourcing, which contributes to reduce the wage inequality and, 
therefore, also to relax the self-selection constraint. In the absence of a direct tax 
instrument, on the other hand, the appearance of outsourcing means that the   
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government implements a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and 
a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise 
have done. 
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